Just watched a very interesting interview with expert Semyvolos on
Espreso. He adds a number of perspectives: (1) The Transdnistria
advance is highly unlikely. The Russian army there is just not
prepared for anything except a "helping hand" towards Odesa, if local
separatists are successful. This is now impossible. (2) A break north
from the Crimea is also unlikely because Ukraine's forces are pretty
strongly dug in at the Perekop isthmus and in Kherson. This would be a
very bloody and uncertain operation. And for Putin anything short of a
successful blitzkrieg is disaster. But a combination "swift push"
against Kyiv and into Donetsk is still possible. And here also
decisive will be the first few days. If Ukraine holds, or yields very
slowly and with much interfire, Putin will be in big trouble.
Semyvolos also raised other interesting points as to Putin's dire
present situation, and the interrelation of the US attitude towards
the Syrians (Putin's military clients) and his Ukraine gamble.. Sem.
thinks that Putin was hoping for a quick and successful advance as of
March 1, in all Ukraine. And the passive resistance of the Ukrainian
military in the Crimea totally disrupted his timetable. At the moment
he is improvising from an increasingly difficult situation.
So the next two days will indeed be extremely important.
Finally, Sem. mentioned the possibility that the Russian Army will not
attack, but remain in a constant state of threatening readiness on the
borders, so as to influence political events in Ukraine. The problem
here is that Ukraine will strengthen day by day, while for Putin it is
the reverse.
So here we are....
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