I do not agree with Friedman's position -- abandon Ukraine to
Russia but it is imnportant for Ukrainians to be aware that people
are advocating this
>From Estonia to Azerbaijan: American Strategy After Ukraine
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/estonia-azerbaijan-american-strategy-after-ukraine?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20140325&utm_term=Gweekly&utm_content=readmore
Geopolitical Weekly
Tuesday, March 25, 2014 - 03:08
By George Friedman
As I discussed last week, the fundamental problem that Ukraine poses for
Russia, beyond a long-term geographical threat, is a crisis in internal
legitimacy. Russian President Vladimir Putin has spent his time in power
rebuilding the authority of the Russian state within Russia and the
authority of Russia within the former Soviet Union. The events in
Ukraine undermine the second strategy and potentially the first. If
Putin cannot maintain at least Ukrainian neutrality, then the world's
perception of him as a master strategist is shattered, and the
legitimacy and authority he has built for the Russian state is, at best,
shaken.
Whatever the origins of the events in Ukraine, the United States is now
engaged in a confrontation with Russia. The Russians believe that the
United States was the prime mover behind regime change in Ukraine. At
the very least, the Russians intend to reverse events in Ukraine. At
most, the Russians have reached the conclusion that the United States
intends to undermine Russia's power. They will resist. The United States
has the option of declining confrontation, engaging in meaningless
sanctions against individuals and allowing events to take their course.
Alternatively, the United States can choose to engage and confront the
Russians.
A failure to engage at this point would cause countries around Russia's
periphery, from Estonia to Azerbaijan, to conclude that with the United
States withdrawn and Europe fragmented, they must reach an accommodation
with Russia. This will expand Russian power and open the door to Russian
influence spreading on the European Peninsula itself. The United States
has fought three wars (World War I, World War II and the Cold War) to
prevent hegemonic domination of the region. Failure to engage would be a
reversal of a century-old strategy.
The American dilemma is how to address the strategic context in a global
setting in which it is less involved in the Middle East and is
continuing to work toward a "pivot to Asia." Nor can the United States
simply allow events to take their course. The United States needs a
strategy that is economical and coherent militarily, politically and
financially. It has two advantages. Some of the countries on Russia's
periphery do not want to be dominated by her. Russia, in spite of some
strengths, is inherently weak and does not require U.S. exertion on the
order of the two World Wars, the Cold War or even the Middle East
engagements of the past decade.
The Russian and U.S. Positions
I discussed Russian options on Ukraine last week. Putin is now in a
position where, in order to retain with confidence his domestic
authority, he must act decisively to reverse the outcome. The problem is
there is no single decisive action that would reverse events.
Eventually, the inherent divisions in Ukraine might reverse events.
However, a direct invasion of eastern Ukraine would simply solidify
opposition to Russia in Kiev and trigger responses internationally that
he cannot predict. In the end, it would simply drive home that although
the Russians once held a dominant position in all of Ukraine, they now
hold it in less than half. In the long run, this option -- like other
short-term options -- would not solve the Russian conundrum.
Whatever Putin does in Ukraine, he has two choices. One is simply to
accept the reversal, which I would argue that he cannot do. The second
is to take action in places where he might achieve rapid diplomatic and
political victories against the West -- the Baltics, Moldova or the
Caucasus -- while encouraging Ukraine's government to collapse into
gridlock and developing bilateral relations along the Estonia-Azerbaijan
line. This would prevent a U.S. strategy of containment -- a strategy
that worked during the Cold War and one that the Europeans are incapable
of implementing on their own. This comes down to the Americans.
The United States has been developing, almost by default, a strategy not
of disengagement but of indirect engagement. Between 1989 and 2008, the
U.S. strategy has been the use of U.S. troops as the default for dealing
with foreign issues. From Panama to Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and
Iraq, the United States followed a policy of direct and early
involvement of U.S. military forces. However, this was not the U.S.
strategy from 1914 to 1989. Then, the strategy was to provide political
support to allies, followed by economic and military aid, followed by
advisers and limited forces, and in some cases pre-positioned forces.
The United States kept its main force in reserve for circumstances in
which (as in 1917 and 1942 and, to a lesser degree, in Korea and
Vietnam) allies could not contain the potential hegemon. Main force was
the last resort.
This was primarily a strategy of maintaining the balance of power. The
containment of the Soviet Union involved creating an alliance system
comprising countries at risk of Soviet attack. Containment was a balance
of power strategy that did not seek the capitulation of the Soviet Union
as much as increasing the risks of offensive action using allied
countries as the first barrier. The threat of full U.S. intervention,
potentially including nuclear weapons, coupled with the alliance
structure, constrained Soviet risk-taking.
Because the current Russian Federation is much weaker than the Soviet
Union was at its height and because the general geographic principle in
the region remains the same, a somewhat analogous balance of power
strategy is likely to emerge after the events in Ukraine. Similar to the
containment policy of 1945-1989, again in principle if not in detail, it
would combine economy of force and finance and limit the development of
Russia as a hegemonic power while exposing the United States to limited
and controlled risk.
The coalescence of this strategy is a development I forecast in two
books, The Next Decade and The Next 100 Years, as a concept I called the
Intermarium. The Intermarium was a plan pursued after World War I by
Polish leader Jozef Pilsudski for a federation, under Poland's aegis, of
Central and Eastern European countries. What is now emerging is not the
Intermarium, but it is close. And it is now transforming from an
abstract forecast to a concrete, if still emergent, reality.
Forces Leading to the Alliance's Emergence
A direct military intervention by the United States in Ukraine is not
possible. First, Ukraine is a large country, and the force required to
protect it would outstrip U.S. capabilities. Second, supplying such a
force would require a logistics system that does not exist and would
take a long time to build. Finally, such an intervention would be
inconceivable without a strong alliance system extending to the West and
around the Black Sea. The United States can supply economic and
political support, but Ukraine cannot counterbalance Russia and the
United States cannot escalate to the point of using its own
forces. Ukraine is a battleground on which Russian forces would have an
advantage and a U.S. defeat would be possible.
If the United States chooses to confront Russia with a military
component, it must be on a stable perimeter and on as broad a front as
possible to extend Russian resources and decrease the probability of
Russian attack at any one point out of fear of retaliation elsewhere.
The ideal mechanism for such a strategy would be NATO, which contains
almost all of the critical countries save Azerbaijan and Georgia. The
problem is that NATO is not a functional alliance. It was designed to
fight the Cold War on a line far to the west of the current line. More
important, there was unity on the principle that the Soviet Union
represented an existential threat to Western Europe.
That consensus is no longer there. Different countries have different
perceptions of Russia and different concerns. For many, a replay of the
Cold War, even in the face of Russian actions in Ukraine, is worse than
accommodation. In addition, the end of the Cold War has led to a massive
drawdown of forces in Europe. NATO simply lacks the force unless there
is a massive and sudden buildup. That will not occur because of the
financial crisis, among other reasons. NATO requires unanimity to act,
and that unanimity is not there.
The countries that were at risk from 1945 to 1989 are not the same as
those at risk today. Many of these countries were part of the Soviet
Union then, and the rest were Soviet satellites. The old alliance system
was not built for this confrontation. The Estonia-Azerbaijan line has as
its primary interest retaining sovereignty in the face of Russian power.
The rest of Europe is not in jeopardy, and these countries are not
prepared to commit financial and military efforts to a problem they
believe can be managed with little risk to them. Therefore, any American
strategy must bypass NATO or at the very least create new structures to
organize the region.
MAP
Characteristics of the Alliance
Each of the various countries involved is unique and has to be addressed
that way. But these countries share the common danger that events in
Ukraine could spread and directly affect their national security
interests, including internal stability. As I observed, the Baltics,
Moldova and the Caucasus are areas where the Russians could seek to
compensate for their defeat. Because of this, and also because of their
intrinsic importance, Poland, Romania and Azerbaijan must be the posts
around which this alliance is built.
The Baltic salient, 145 kilometers (90 miles) from St. Petersburg in
Estonia, would be a target for Russian destabilization. Poland borders
the Baltics and is the leading figure in the Visegrad battlegroup, an
organization within the European Union. Poland is eager for a closer
military relationship with the United States, as its national strategy
has long been based on third-power guarantees against aggressors. The
Poles cannot defend themselves and the Baltics, given the combat
capabilities necessary for the task.
The Dniester River is 80 kilometers from Odessa, the main port on the
Black Sea for Ukraine and an important one for Russia. The Prut River is
about 200 kilometers from Bucharest, the capital of Romania. Moldova is
between these two rivers. It is a battleground region, at least of
competing political factions. Romania must be armed and supported in
protecting Moldova and in organizing southeastern Europe. In Western
hands, Moldova threatens Odessa, Ukraine's major port also used by
Russia on the Black Sea. In Russian hands, Moldova threatens Bucharest.
At the far end of the alliance structure I am envisioning is Azerbaijan,
on the Caspian Sea bordering Russia and Iran. Should Dagestan and
Chechnya destabilize, Azerbaijan -- which is Islamic and majority Shiite
but secular -- would become critical for limiting the regional spread of
jihadists. Azerbaijan also would support the alliance's position in the
Black Sea by supporting Georgia and would serve as a bridge for
relations (and energy) should Western relations with Iran continue to
improve. To the southwest, the very pro-Russian Armenia -- which has a
Russian troop presence and a long-term treaty with Moscow -- could
escalate tensions with Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh. Previously, this
was not a pressing issue for the United States. Now it is. The security
of Georgia and its ports on the Black Sea requires Azerbaijan's
inclusion in the alliance.
Azerbaijan serves a more strategic purpose. Most of the countries in the
alliance are heavy importers of Russian energy; for instance, 91 percent
of Poland's energy imports and 86 percent of Hungary's come from Russia.
There is no short-term solution to this problem, but Russia needs the
revenue from these exports as much as these countries need the energy.
Developing European shale and importing U.S. energy is a long-term
solution. A medium-term solution, depending on pipeline developments
that Russia has tended to block in the past, is sending natural gas from
Azerbaijan to Europe. Until now, this has been a commercial issue, but
it has become a strategically critical issue. The Caspian region, of
which Azerbaijan is the lynchpin, is the only major alternative to
Russia for energy. Therefore, rapid expansion of pipelines to the heart
of Europe is as essential as providing Azerbaijan with the military
capability to defend itself (a capability it is prepared to pay for and,
unlike other allied countries, does not need to be underwritten).
The key to the pipeline will be Turkey's willingness to permit transit.
I have not included Turkey as a member of this alliance. Its internal
politics, complex relations and heavy energy dependence on Russia make
such participation difficult. I view Turkey in this alliance structure
as France in the Cold War. It was aligned yet independent, militarily
self-sufficient yet dependent on the effective functioning of others.
Turkey, inside or outside of the formal structure, will play this role
because the future of the Black Sea, the Caucasus and southeastern
Europe is essential to Ankara.
These countries, diverse as they are, share a desire not to be dominated
by the Russians. That commonality is a basis for forging them into a
functional military alliance. This is not an offensive force but a force
designed to deter Russian expansion. All of these countries need modern
military equipment, particularly air defense, anti-tank and mobile
infantry. In each case, the willingness of the United States to supply
these weapons, for cash or credit as the situation requires, will
strengthen pro-U.S. political forces in each country and create a wall
behind which Western investment can take place. And it is an
organization that others can join, which unlike NATO does not allow each
member the right to veto.
The Practicality of the U.S. Strategy
There are those who would criticize this alliance for including members
who do not share all the democratic values of the U.S. State Department.
This may be true. It is also true that during the Cold War the United
States was allied with the Shah's Iran, Turkey and Greece under
dictatorship and Mao's China after 1971. Having encouraged Ukrainian
independence, the United States -- in trying to protect that
independence and the independence of other countries in the region -- is
creating an alliance structure that will include countries, such as
Azerbaijan, that have been criticized. However, if energy does not come
from Azerbaijan, it will come from Russia, and then the Ukrainian events
will dissolve into tragic farce. The State Department must grapple with
the harsh forces its own policies have unleashed. This suggests that the
high-mindedness borne of benign assumptions now proven to be illusions
must make way for realpolitik calculations.
The balance of power strategy allows the United States to use the
natural inclination of allies to bolster its own position and take
various steps, of which military intervention is the last, not the
first. It recognizes that the United States, as nearly 25 percent of the
world's economy and the global maritime hegemon, cannot evade
involvement. Its very size and existence involves it. Nor can the United
States confine itself to gestures like sanctions on 20 people. This is
not seen as a sign of resolve as much as weakness. It does mean that as
the United States engages in issues like Ukraine and must make strategic
decisions, there are alternatives to intervention -- such as alliances.
In this case, a natural alliance structure presents itself -- a
descendant of NATO but shaped for this crisis, much like the alliance I
forecast previously.
In my view, Russian power is limited and has flourished while the United
States was distracted by its wars in the Middle East and while Europe
struggled with its economic crisis. That does not mean Russia is not
dangerous. It has short-term advantages, and its insecurity means that
it will take risks. Weak and insecure states with temporary advantages
are dangerous. The United States has an interest in acting early because
early action is cheaper than acting in the last extremity. This is a
case of anti-air missiles, attack helicopters, communications systems
and training, among other things. These are things the United States has
in abundance. It is not a case of deploying divisions, of which it has
few. The Poles, Romanians, Azerbaijanis and certainly the Turks can
defend themselves. They need weapons and training, and that will keep
Russia contained within its cauldron as it plays out a last hand as a
great power.
Editor's Note: We invite subscribers to access the full text of the
chapters that focused on Russia's unsustainable revival in international
affairs from George Friedman's 2011 book, The Next Decade, and his 2009
book, The Next 100 Years, by clicking the links below. Excerpts
reprinted with permission from Doubleday, a division of Penguin Random
House, Inc.
InfoUkes Inc. Gerald William Kokodyniak
Suite 185, 3044 Bloor Street West Webmaster InfoUkes Inc.
Etobicoke, Ontario [email protected]
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